The tool is the registry.

One is a single read-only diligence snapshot: the M&A shape, with the access a buyer actually gets and one exported artifact at the end of it. The other is a continuous series of snapshots with a diff between them.

Neither assumes a governance baseline exists. No AI gateway, no CMDB, no OpenTelemetry. agentlens builds the baseline rather than diffing against one, which is why the same tool serves both.

Whether an agent is monitored is inferred from observable properties of the agent itself: the path its traffic egresses by, whether its credential is attributable to a person or a service, where it was deployed from, who owns the compute it runs on, and whether independent sources corroborate each other about it.

None of that is a lookup, because there is nothing to look it up in. That is the premise the whole design rests on.

agentlens can observe, correlate and recommend. It does not gain apply powers or hold the write-admin credentials needed to change the environment it examines.

That boundary keeps a diligence collector safe to point at infrastructure the operator may not control, and keeps discovery evidence separate from enforcement.

When containment is recommended, agentlens emits a versioned recommendation and specification. Blackwall consumes that artifact behind its own approval, credential, rollback and audit boundaries.

The pairing is deliberate: discovery stays read-only while mutation remains a separate, explicitly authorized act.